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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. Google is one of the largest and richest corporations in the world.  Its 
domination has been expressed in a variety of markets and is the subject of 
substantial antitrust litigation. In October 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice and 
the Attorneys General of eleven states initiated an action to restrain Google “from 
unlawfully maintaining monopolies in the markets for general search services, 
search advertising, and general search text advertising in the United States through 
anticompetitive and exclusionary practices.” United States of America v. Google 
LLC, No. 1:20-cv-3010, Dkt. No. 1 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2020). And months earlier, 
Epic Games, Inc. filed suit under the Sherman Act to “end Google’s unlawful 
monopolization and anti-competitive restraints.” Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC, 
No. 3:20-cv-5671, Dkt. No. 1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020). 
2. Android operates in one of the various markets that Google dominates. 
Indeed, after acquiring Android in July 2005, Google declared that “Android is 
poised for world domination.” Google was right. Today, Android is a dominant 
mobile operating system, running on approximately 75% of the world's mobile 
devices. In the United States, Android captures about 47% of the U.S. mobile 
operating system market. The only alternative to Android in the United States is 
Apple's iOS, which captures the remaining 52% of the U.S. mobile operating system 
market. 
3. Google Play (the application store formerly known as the Android 
Market) is available to electronic device users running Google's Android operating 
system ("OS"). While Google claims that the Android OS is maintained as "open" 
source software, Google has engaged in a course of conduct designed to deter 
competition in the market for Android applications or "apps" and products sold with 
such apps (the "Google Play Market").  
4. Plaintiff Ashly Esquivel ("Plaintiff"), on behalf of herself and all others 
similarly situated (the "Class," as defined below), brings this class action for 
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damages and other relief pursuant to federal antitrust and California unfair 
competition and consumer protection laws. Plaintiff and the putative Class have 
overpaid or otherwise suffered economic losses due to Google's monopolization of 
the Google Play Market and therefore sue for damages and other relief. 
5. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury. 
II. PARTIES 
A. Plaintiff 
6. Plaintiff Ashly Esquivel ("Plaintiff") is an individual, resides in 
Inglewood, California, and purchased and paid Google for one or more apps through 
Google Play. 
B. Defendants  
7. Alphabet Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business in Mountain View, California. Google LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Alphabet Inc. 
8. Google LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal 
place of business in Mountain View, California. Google LLC is a technology 
company providing a search engine and other internet-related products, including 
online advertising. 
9. Alphabet Inc. and Google LLC are collectively referred to herein as 
"Google" or "Defendants." 
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
10. Plaintiff brings this action under Sections 4, 12, and 16 of the Clayton 
Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22, 26) for treble damages, other relief, and reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs with respect to the injuries sustained by Plaintiff arising 
from Defendants' violations of the federal antitrust laws, including Section 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. § 2). 
11. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections 1331, 
1337(a), and 1367 of Title 28 of the United States Code (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a) 
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1367). 
12. This Court has in personam jurisdiction over Defendants because each, 
directly and/or through its ownership or control of subsidiaries: (a) transacted 
business in the United States, including in this District; (b) are registered to do 
business in the state of California; (c) had substantial aggregate contacts with the 
United States, including this District; and/or (d) engaged in anticompetitive acts that 
were directed at, and had a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable and 
intended effect of injuring, the business or property of persons and entities residing 
in, located in, or doing business throughout the United States, including in this 
District. Defendants conduct business throughout the United States, including in this 
District, and have purposefully availed themselves of the laws of the United States. 
13. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to Sections 15 and 22 of Title 
15 of the United States Code (15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22) and Sections 1391(b) and (c) of 
Title 28 of the United States Code (28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c)), despite the Google 
LLC’s Terms of Service suggesting that the courts in Santa Clara County, California 
are the proper venue in which to bring suit against Google LLC, because a 
substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims against Google LLC 
and Alphabet, Inc. occurred in this District, a substantial portion of the affected 
interstate trade and commerce was carried out in this District, and one or more of the 
Defendants reside in this District or is licensed to do business in this District. Each 
Defendant has transacted business, maintained substantial contacts, and/or 
committed overt acts in furtherance of the illegal restraint of trade throughout this 
District. The anticompetitive conduct alleged herein has been directed at, and has 
had the intended effect of, causing injury to persons residing in, located in, or doing 
business in this District. 
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS  
A. Background Regarding Google 
14. In 1998, Google launched as a general online search engine that served 
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users web results in response to online queries. Google's key innovation was its 
PageRank algorithm, which ranked the relevance of a webpage by assessing how 
many other webpages linked to it. PageRank enabled Google to improve the quality 
of its search results even as the web rapidly grew, in contrast with the technology 
used by rival search engines. While Google had entered a crowded field, it had 
become the world's largest search engine by 2000. Later that year, Google launched 
AdWords, an online advertising service that let businesses purchase keyword 
advertising to appear on Google's search results page—an offering that would 
evolve to become the heart of Google's business model. 
15. Google is now one of the world's major corporations. For 2019, Google 
reported total revenues of $160.7 billion—up 45% from 2017—and more than $33 
billion in net income. Google has enjoyed strong and stable profits, with profit 
margins greater than 20% for nine out of the last ten years, close to three times 
greater than the average for a U.S. firm. Financial analysts predict that Google is 
well positioned to maintain its control, noting that "Alphabet has established 
unusually deep competitive moats around its business." 
16. Google is ubiquitous across the digital economy, serving as the 
infrastructure for core products and services online. It has grown and maintained its 
search engine power, such that go "Google" something is now synonymous with 
online searching. Google is now also the largest provider of digital advertising, a 
leading web browser, a dominant OS, and a major provider of digital mapping, 
cloud computing, email, and voice assistant services, alongside dozens of other 
offerings. Nine of Google's products—Android, Chrome, Gmail, Google Search, 
Google Photos, Google Drive, Google Play, Google Maps, and YouTube—have 
more than a billion users each. Each of these goods and services provides Google 
with a trove of user data, reinforcing its control across markets and driving greater 
monetization through online ads. 
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B. The Google Play Market 
17. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, when Google was formed, internet 
searches were almost solely performed through browsers on computers. But, over 
the past two decades, individuals increasingly used non-desktop devices, such as 
phones and other electronic devices, to access the internet. Thus, Google launched a 
business policy to target users of electronic devices and to ensure their products 
implement versions of Google's technology, products, and OS. 
18. An app is software designed for use on a mobile or tablet device to 
provide access to digital content or services. Popular apps allow users to share 
content or play games and, importantly, permit "in app" sale or purchase 
transactions for goods and services. Apps can be pre-installed on an electronic 
device as a component of the OS by the Original Equipment Manufacturer 
("OEM"). They can also be loaded directly onto the electronic device from the web 
using a web browser (a process that Google refers to as "sideloading"). The most 
frequent way that consumers access apps is through an app store, which itself may 
be pre-installed on the electronic device. Google uses Google Play to control the app 
market for devices using the Android OS. Google Play is a digital distribution 
service operated and developed by Google. 
19. An app store is the central point for users to access apps. It centralizes 
and curates the distribution of apps in a convenient manner for users.  It also allows 
users to search, review, and buy an app in one spot. 
20. There is a separate market for apps specific to the OS, including apps 
developed for Apple iOS which only work on Apple electronic devices, and apps 
developed for Android OS which only work on Android electronic devices. For the 
same reason, Apple's App Store and Google Play do not compete against one 
another. 
21. Google acquired Android in July 2005 for an estimated $50 million. 
Google describes Android as "a free, open-source mobile operating system" 
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available to anyone to download and modify on a royalty-free basis. Indeed, 
Android is unique in that Google does not generally monetize its operating system 
by selling proprietary hardware or demanding licensing fees. In practice, 
smartphone manufacturers that seek to use Android must sign Google's licensing 
agreements, however, as Google limits the functionality of non-licensed usage. Only 
through Google's licensing agreements can smartphone manufacturers access 
Google's proprietary apps, such as Gmail, YouTube, Chrome, Google Maps, and 
Google Play Store. In return, Google requires that certain apps must be pre-installed 
and must receive prominent placement on mobile devices. Device manufacturers 
must also enter into an agreement that prevents them from customizing Android and 
from building an Android “fork” that would make the version of Android running 
on a device incompatible with apps built for the Android ecosystem. 
22. Google released the Android OS to acquire and gain control. Google 
released the Android code for free as "open source," which means that anyone could 
access the code and modify it. Modifying the OS constitutes a "fork." 
23. The open source aspect of the Android OS was key to its wide adoption 
by OEMs (such as LG, Motorola, Samsung, etc.) and phone carriers (such as AT&T, 
T-Mobile/Spring, Verizon, etc.). Google's supposed lack of control over an open 
source OS led skeptical OEMs and phone carriers to use Android instead of other 
choices that were available then. The open source model suggested that the 
distributors, and not Google, would ultimately hold control over their devices and 
the app ecosystem on those devices. 
24. However, once the distributors agreed to use Android OS, app 
developers looking for wide distribution of their apps were then incentivized by 
Google to develop apps compatible with Android OS. As more apps became 
available on Android OS, the OS became more eye-catching to consumers, which in 
turn led to even more developers designing for Android. 
25. To achieve desired network effects and make the Android system 
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ubiquitous, Google then "shared" its search advertising and app store revenues with 
distributers to further induce distributors to give up control over the OS and what 
apps come preinstalled on electronic devices. 
26. Google solidified market control of Android OS through a series of 
contracts with distributors designed to diminish competition. Google requires OEMs 
such as LG, Motorola, and Samsung to enter "anti-forking agreements." These 
agreements specifically prohibit OEMs from developing or distributing versions of 
Android that do not comply with onerous Google-controlled technical standards. 
The signatories may not distribute devices with Android forks, or use their powerful 
brands to market forks on behalf of third parties. As a result of Google's 
anticompetitive practices, Android OS represents over 95% of licensable OS for 
smartphones and tablets in the United States. 
27. With control over the dominant Android OS, Google exercised its 
monopoly power to establish Google Play as the dominant "store" by which other 
applications can be downloaded for use by consumers on the Android ecosystem. 
28. Google required that electronic device OEMs pre-install Google Play 
on all electronic devices, knowing that users infrequently change defaults. Google 
also refuses to allow any rival app store to be downloaded from Google Play. 
Indeed, third-party app stores could only be accessed by "sideloading," a 
complicated multi-step process where users are warned that sideloading is unsafe. 
Thus, while Google theoretically permits sideloading third-party app stores, few 
users pursue this option because Google implements significant frictions designed to 
navigate consumers away from sideloading. Google goes out of its way to make 
side-loading difficult. Epic's recent lawsuit against Google (Epic Games, Inc. v. 
Google LLC, No. 3:20-cv-5671 (N.D. Cal.)) alleges: 
Google ensures that the Android process is technically complex, 
confusing and threatening, filled with dire warnings that scare most 
consumers into abandoning the lengthy process. For example, 
depending on the version of Android running on a mobile device, 
downloading and installing Fortnite on an Android device could take as 






























1699008.1  -9- Case No. 
CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 
 
many as 16 steps or more, including requiring the user to make changes 
to the device's default settings and manually granting various 
permissions while being warned that doing so is dangerous. 
29. Additionally, Epic's complaint notes that when it attempted to work 
with LG, another Android device manufacturer, LG told Epic that it had a contract 
with Google "to block side downloading off Google Play Store this year." If a user 
is able to install the competing app store, Google blocks them "from offering basic 
functions, such as automatic updating of apps in the background, which is available 
for apps downloaded from the Google Play Store." 
30. Google also limits basic app functions that are available to apps 
downloaded on Google Play, including making it more challenging for users to 
update apps (versus automatic updates in the electronic device's background). 
31. Because Google Play is the primary way users install applications on 
Android devices, it effectively functions as a gatekeeper for software distribution on 
all devices with Android OS. 
32. As a result of its monopolistic conduct, Google has extracted supra-
competitive prices for its Android app distribution services and in-app purchases 
made through Google Play, including a 30% commission on sales of paid apps and a 
30% fee for in-app purchases. Google collects and processes these commissions and 
fees directly from Plaintiff and Class Members, remitting the remainder of their 
payment to the app developer. 
33. Google uses its gatekeeping power over third-party app developers 
through arbitrary and unaccountable enforcement of Google Play policies, which 
then protect the power of Google's own services and stifles competitors. One app 
"Callsome" was banned from Google Play for "Ad Policy" violations, for example, 
only to learn later that a similar product was able to stay and thrive in Google Play. 
Callsome believes it was banned because of its partnership with SmartApp, which at 
the time was widely considered to be a nascent but rising rival to Google in the 
Russian market. 
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34. Google has used Android to entrench and extend its control in a variety 
of ways that undermine competition. These include: (1) using contractual 
restrictions and exclusivity provisions to extend Google's search monopoly from 
desktop to mobile and to favor its own applications; and (2) devising Android 
Lockbox, a covert effort to track real-time data on the usage and engagement of 
third-party apps, some of which were Google's competitors. Additionally, Google's 
Play Store now functions as a gatekeeper, which Google is increasingly using to 
hike fees and favor its own apps. Overall, Android's business practices reveal how 
Google has maintained its search dominance through relying on various contractual 
restrictions that blocked competition and through exploiting information 
asymmetries, rather than by competing on the merits. 
V. GOOGLE'S MONOPOLY IN THE GOOGLE PLAY MARKET 
35. The Play Store is the dominant app store on Android devices. Google 
chose a single app store to control software distribution on the Android ecosystem, 
with one executive noting that "we would strongly prefer to have one Market that 
everyone focuses on." 
36. Because Google's Play Store is the primary way that users install 
applications on Android devices, the Play Store effectively functions as a gatekeeper 
for software distribution on a majority of the world's mobile devices. For example, 
Google uses its Play Store gatekeeper power to charge high fees to mobile 
developers. Amazon, Spotify, Netflix, Epic Games, and Tinder have all expressed 
public concerns about Google's app store fees, along with Apple. As a lawsuit 
recently filed by Epic Games stated, "Google has thus installed itself as an 
unavoidable middleman for app developers who wish to reach Android users and 
vice versa. Google uses this monopoly power to impose a tax that siphons monopoly 
profits for itself every time an app developer transacts with a consumer for the sale 
of an app or in-app digital content." 
37. Although Google does not block off all alternative channels for 
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accessing apps allowing, for example, both some app stores and side-loading in 
practice, these options do not provide meaningful alternatives to the Google Play 
Store. In contrast the dual dominance of the Play Store and the Android ecosystem 
enable Google to exert control and engage in conduct that harms competition by 
exploiting, excluding, and discriminating against rivals. 
38. The Play Store's control over app distribution on Android devices has 
enabled Google to begin to require use of its in-app payment system (IAP). As a 
result, Google has become the middleman between app developers and their 
customers. This was not always the case. Google has changed its stance and re-
interpreted policies over time to require more app developers to use Google Pay. 
Beginning in 2014, for example, Google designated specific categories of 
applications—including mobile games—that would be required to use Google Play 
In-App Billing. Recently, Google has begun insisting that a broader category of apps 
will be required to use Google IAP exclusively, no longer allowing the option of a 
third-party payment processor. 
39. Google maintains a monopoly in the Google Play Market and is able to 
charge supra-competitive prices for apps and in-app purchases. Google uses 
anticompetitive covenants in Google's Mobile Application Distribution Agreement 
("MADA"), requiring OEMs to license the entire suite of Google applications and 
services to also license the Android OS. Google also requires OEMS to pre-install 
Google Play on its home page. If OEM refuse these restrictive terms and conditions, 
they lose access to the Android OS. 
40. As a result of the MADA terms and conditions, Google has 
successfully prevented competition from its competitors in the Google Play Market. 
Google's MADA agreements also allow Google to charge supra-competitive prices 
for apps and in-app purchases, harming Plaintiff and Class Members by limiting 
consumer choice. 
41. Similarly, Google uses its Developer Distribution Agreement ("DDA") 
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to contractually restrict competition in the Google Play Market. Amongst other 
terms, the DDA mandated that developers comply with Google's Developer 
Program Policies, including using Google's proprietary in-app billing for in-app 
game payments, as well as certain other digital in-app purchases. The DDA also 
requires that developers "may not use Google Play to distribute or make available 
any Product that has a purpose that facilitates the distribution of software 
applications and games for use on Android devices outside of Google Play." Google 
has the power to eliminate any Android app it believes has violated any portion of 
the DDA. 
42. Google's anticompetitive agreements with other companies are not 
limited to Google Play or Android. Google has also engaged in illegal tactics to 
protect its other monopolies, including in web search. For example, Google and 
Apple have a long-standing agreement whereby Apple agreed to make Google the 
default search engine on Apple products: 
When Tim Cook and Sundar Pichai, the chief executives of Apple and 
Google, were photographed eating dinner together in 2017 at an 
upscale Vietnamese restaurant called Tamarine, the picture set off a 
tabloid-worthy frenzy about the relationship between the two most 
powerful companies in Silicon Valley. 
As the two men sipped red wine at a window table inside the restaurant 
in Palo Alto, their companies were in tense negotiations to renew one 
of the most lucrative business deals in history: an agreement to feature 
Google's search engine as the preselected choice on Apple's iPhone and 
other devices. The updated deal was worth billions of dollars to both 
companies and cemented their status at the top of the tech industry's 
pecking order. . . . 
[T]he pact, which was first inked 15 years ago and has rarely been 
discussed by either company, has highlighted the special relationship 
between Silicon Valley's two most valuable companies an unlikely 
union of rivals that regulators say is unfairly preventing smaller 
companies from flourishing. . . . 
Nearly half of Google's search traffic now comes from Apple devices . . 
. and the prospect of losing the Apple deal has been described as a 
"code red" scenario inside [Google].  
Apple now receives an estimated $8 billion to $12 billion in annual 
payments up from $1 billion a year in 2014 in exchange for building 
Google's search engine into its products. It is probably the single 
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biggest payment that Google makes to anyone and accounts for 14 to 
21 percent of Apple's annual profits. That's not money Apple would be 
eager to walk away from. 
Daisuke Wakabayashi and Jack Nicas, "Apple, Google and a Deal That Controls the 
Internet," N.Y. Times (Oct. 25, 2020) 
43. Google therefore uses anticompetitive agreements with various 
companies to acquire and maintain its various monopolies in various markets. 
VI. RELEVANT MARKET  
44. For purposes of this action, the relevant product market is the market 
for apps and in-app purchases on mobile devices compatible with the Android OS. 
For purposes of this action, the relevant geographic market is the United States and 
its territories. Google has substantial and long-lasting power in this market, app 
stores and apps are developed and distributed throughout the United States, and 
Google Play is available to Android users throughout the United States. 
VII. ANTITRUST INJURY 
45. Plaintiff and Class Members purchased Android apps and in-app digital 
content directly from Google through Google Play. Without the unlawful restraints 
described above, Plaintiff and Class Members would not have to pay supra-
competitive price for apps and in-app purchases. Google's anticompetitive practices 
also stalled, limited or foreclosed competition and innovation in the Google Play 
Market. 
VIII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TOLLING  
46. Plaintiff and Class Members had no knowledge of Google's 
anticompetitive conduct, or of facts sufficient to place them on inquiry notice of the 
claims asserted herein, during the Class Period and continuing thereafter, until 
October 2020 when the United States House of Representatives published its 
Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets and provided details concerning 
Google and its conduct. 
47. Plaintiff and Class Members suffered economic loss due to Google's 
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wrongful exercise of monopoly power. Plaintiff’s interactions with Google were 
insufficient, however, to discover Google's wrongful conduct. 
48. Furthermore, no public information was available during the Class 
Period or thereafter that suggests Google's business activities were done to 
monopolize the Google Play Market until the House of Representatives published 
the Report of its investigation against Google. 
49. Moreover, it was reasonable for Plaintiff and Class Members not to 
suspect that Defendants were engaging in any unlawful anticompetitive behavior. 
Plaintiff and Class Members are simply consumers of apps and were not active 
participants in the market. 
50. Plaintiff alleges a continuing course of unlawful conduct by Google, 
including conduct within the applicable limitation periods. That conduct has 
inflicted continuing and accumulating harms within the applicable statutes of 
limitation. 
51. For these reasons, the statutes of limitations applicable to Plaintiff’s 
and Class Members' claims have been tolled with respect to the claims asserted 
herein until the House of Representatives’ Report about Google became public. 
52. Additionally, or alternatively, application of the doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment tolled the statutes of limitations on Plaintiff's and the Class Members’ 
claims. Plaintiff and Class members had no knowledge of Google's wrongful 
acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power in the relevant market, or of facts 
sufficient to place them on inquiry notice of their claims, during the Class Period 
and continuing thereafter. No information in the public domain or otherwise 
available to Plaintiff and Class Members during the Class Period suggested that 
Google had wrongfully acquired a monopoly or was using its monopoly power to 
charge supra-competitive prices. 
53. In failing to disclose its wrongful monopolization, in addition to 
denying it was engaged in such conduct, Google was able to conceal its illegal 
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conduct. In fact, Google has made public denials to this effect in the United States 
and to foreign regulators. 
54. After it was revealed that the House  of Representatives was 
investigating Google's monopoly, Google denied such conduct. Similarly, in 
response to recent news reports of impending antitrust actions against it by federal 
and state officials for monopolization, Google stated publicly that competition is 
flourishing and that publishers and marketers have enormous choices. This was 
simply incorrect. 
55. Further, Google's anticompetitive monopoly conduct was inherently 
self-concealing because, as Google knew, its disclosure likely would have led to 
governmental enforcement activity or civil liability. Google's conduct is subject to 
antitrust regulation, so it was reasonable for Plaintiff and Class Members to presume 
that they were purchasing apps in a competitive market. A reasonable person under 
the circumstances would not have had reason to suspect that apps were being sold at 
supra-competitive prices at any time during the Class Period. 
IX. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS  
56. Plaintiff brings this action both on behalf of herself and as a class 
action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on behalf of 
the following Class: 
From at least as early as January 1, 2016 through the present (the 
"Class Period"), all persons and entities in the United States that paid 
Google for an app on Google Play, subscription fees for an app 
obtained on Google Play, or app content from an app downloaded from 
Google Play. 
57. This class definition specifically excludes any of the Defendants named 
herein, any of the Defendants' parent companies, subsidiaries, and affiliates, and any 
of the Defendants' officers, directors, management, employees, subsidiaries, 
affiliates or agents. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand, modify, or alter the class 
definition in response to information learned during discovery. 
58. This action is properly brought as a class action under Federal Rule of 
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Civil Procedure 23(a) for the following reasons: 
a. Adequacy of Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)): Plaintiff will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class in that he has no 
interests antagonistic to those of the other members of the Class, and 
Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in antitrust class actions 
and complex litigation as counsel; 
b. Commonality and Predominance (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and 
23(b)(3)): There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed 
Class which predominate over any questions that may affect particular 
Class Members. Such common questions of law and fact include, but 
are not limited to: 
i. Whether Google unlawfully acquired and maintained monopoly 
power in the relevant market; 
ii. Whether Google unlawfully attempted to acquire and maintain 
monopoly power in the relevant market; 
iii. Whether Google monopolized the market for Android apps at 
any time during the Class Period; 
iv. Whether Google attempted to monopolize the market for 
Android apps at any time during the Class Period; 
v. Whether Google engaged in unlawful or unfair competition; 
vi. Whether Plaintiff and the other Class Members were injured by 
Defendants' conduct and, if so, the determination of the 
appropriate Class-wide measure of damages; 
vii. Whether Defendants unjustly enriched themselves to the 
detriment of the Plaintiff and the other Class Members, thereby 
entitling Plaintiff and the other Class Members to disgorgement 
of all benefits derived by Defendants; 
viii. Whether Plaintiff and the other Class Members are entitled to, 
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among other things, equitable relief, and, if so, the nature and 
extent of such relief; 
ix. Whether Plaintiff and the other Class Members had any reason to 
know or suspect Defendants were engaging in any unlawful 
anticompetitive behavior; and 
x. Whether Defendants fraudulently concealed their unlawful 
anticompetitive behavior from Plaintiff and the other Class 
Members. 
c. Numerosity (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): The proposed Class is so 
numerous and geographically dispersed that the joinder of all Class 
Members is impracticable. While Plaintiff does not know the exact 
number and identity of all Class Members, Plaintiff is informed and 
believes that there are millions of Class Members. The precise number 
of Class Members can be ascertained through discovery; 
d. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)): Plaintiff's claims are typical of 
the claims of the other Class Members. Plaintiff and the Class have 
been injured by the same wrongful practices of Defendants. Plaintiff's 
claims arise from the same practices and conduct that give rise to the 
claims of the Class and are based on the same legal theories; 
59. This action is properly brought as a class action under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(b) for the following reasons: 
a. Superiority (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)): Certification under Rule 
23(b)(3) is appropriate because questions of law or fact common to 
members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and class action treatment is superior to the other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this 
controversy. 
b. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)): 
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Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is warranted because Defendants 
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, 
thereby making appropriate final equitable, declaratory, or other 
appropriate equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 
c. The proposed Class is ascertainable and there is a well-defined 
community of interest in the questions of law or fact alleged herein 
since the rights of each proposed Class Member was infringed or 
violated in the same fashion; 
60. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and 
efficient adjudication of this controversy for at least the following reasons: 
a. Given the size of individual Class Member’s claims and the expense of 
litigating those claims, few, if any, Class Members could afford to or 
would seek legal redress individually for the wrongs Defendants 
committed against them and absent Class Members have no substantial 
interest in individually controlling the prosecution of individual 
actions; 
b. Without a class action, Class Members will suffer damages, and 
Defendant's violations of law will proceed without remedy while 
Defendants reaped and retained the substantial proceeds of their 
wrongful conduct; 
c. This action will promote an orderly and expeditious administration and 
adjudication of the proposed Class claims, economies of time, effort, 
and resources will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions will be 
ensured; and 
d. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the 
management of this litigation which would preclude its maintenance as 
a class action. 
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X. CAUSES OF ACTION 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law 
(Cal. Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.) 
61. Plaintiff hereby repeats and incorporates by reference each preceding 
paragraph as if fully stated herein. 
62. Google's conduct is unlawful in violation of California's Unfair 
Competition Law ("UCL") because it violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2. 
63. Google has engaged in unfair business practices through the conduct 
alleged herein, which has restrained competition. Google's conduct is unfair and in 
violation of the UCL because it violates California's clearly established public 
policy forbidding monopolistic acts. Google wrongfully acquired and unlawfully 
maintained monopoly power in the relevant market through the conduct alleged 
herein, including by leveraging its monopoly power in the Google Play Market to 
coerce the purchase of Android apps and in-app products and services at artificial 
prices. 
64. Google's practices also are unlawful in violation of the UCL because 
they offend public policy; are immoral, unethical, oppressive, outrageous, 
unscrupulous, and substantially injurious; and caused substantial harm, including in 
the form of artificially inflated prices, that greatly outweigh any possible utility from 
the practices. 
65. Google's conduct actually and proximately caused Plaintiff and Class 
Members to lose money or property. On behalf of the Class, Plaintiff seeks 
damages, other relief, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, as well as any other 
relief the Court may deem just or proper. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION  
Monopolization Under the Sherman Act 
(15 U.S.C. § 2) 
66. Plaintiff hereby repeats and incorporates by reference each preceding 
paragraph as if fully stated herein. 
67. Plaintiff brings this claim on her own behalf and on behalf of each 
member of the Class described above. 
68. The relevant market is the U.S. market for apps and in-app purchases 
sold in the Google Play Market. 
69. Google has gained and maintains monopoly power in the relevant 
market by improper and unlawful means. More specifically, Google has willfully 
acquired and maintained such power by coercing the purchase of Android apps and 
in-app products and services at artificial prices and by its patently exclusionary 
conduct, including its refusal to allow rival app stores to be accessed through 
Google Play and implementing significant frictions designed to steer consumers 
away from sideloading third-party app stores. Consumers must use the Google Play 
Market to obtain Android apps and in-app purchases. 
70. For the reasons stated herein, substantial barriers to entry exist in the 
relevant market. 
71. Google has the power to exclude competition in the relevant market, 
and it has used that power, including by way of its unlawful practices in restraint of 
trade as described herein, to maintain and expand its monopoly power in that 
market. 
72. Google's conduct as described herein, including its unlawful practices 
in restraint of trade, is exclusionary vis-à-vis its rival app stores in the U.S. market 
for Android apps and in-app purchases. 
73. Google has behaved as alleged herein in an attempt to obtain a 
monopoly in the U.S. market for Android apps and in-app purchases, with the effect 
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being that competition is foreclosed, innovation is stifled, and consumer choice is 
gravely diminished. Additionally, Google has abused its market power by charging 
supra-competitive 30% commission on sales of paid apps and a 30% fee for in-app 
purchases. Further, Google's actions have depressed output and stifled innovation 
and options for consumers as alleged herein. 
74. There is no business necessity or other pro-competitive justification for 
Google's conduct. 
75. As a direct and proximate cause of Google's conduct, Plaintiff and 
members of the Class have suffered antitrust injury. Plaintiff and the Class Members 
paid significantly higher prices for Android apps and in-app purchases than they 
would have but for Google's unlawful conduct. That conduct also deprived Plaintiff 
and Class Members of improved quality and innovation in the relevant markets. 
76. Plaintiff is inclined to continue to purchase Android apps and in-app 
purchases in the future because of her investment in the electronic device containing 
the Android OS. 
77. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to damages, including treble 
damages, sustained because of Google's monopolistic acts and practices. 
78. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to equitable relief as 
appropriate to remedy Google's monopolistic conduct and restore competition in the 
relevant market. Members of the Class are regular users of the Google Play Market 
and will continue to purchase such apps and in-app products and services and suffer 
further injury if Google's monopoly is not terminated. 
79. Plaintiff and the Class also are entitled to equitable relief to prevent 
Google from persisting in its unlawful, inequitable, and unjustified behavior to their 
detriment, with such an injunction at a minimum prohibiting Google from 
continuing to charge a supra-competitive commission on sales of paid apps and a 
supra-competitive percent fee for in-app purchases. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 26. 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Attempted Monopolization Under the Sherman Act 
(15 U.S.C. § 2) 
 
80. Plaintiff hereby repeats and incorporates by reference each preceding 
paragraph as if fully stated herein. 
81. Plaintiff brings this claim on her own behalf and on behalf of each 
member of the Class described above. 
82. The relevant market is the U.S. market for apps and in-app purchases 
sold in the Google Play Market. 
83. Google has attempted to monopolize the U.S. market for Android apps. 
More specifically, Google has willfully acquired and maintained market power by 
its patently exclusionary conduct, including its refusal to allow rival app stores to be 
accessed through Google Play and implementing significant frictions designed to 
steer consumers away from side loading third-party app stores. Consumers must use 
the Google Play Market to obtain Android apps and in-app purchases. 
84. Google's anticompetitive conduct has created a dangerous likelihood 
that it will attain monopoly power in the U.S. market for Android apps and in-app 
purchases. 
85. Google has a specific intent to attain monopoly power in the U.S. 
market for Android apps and in-app purchases. Now, and if its unlawful restraints 
are not checked, Google has a dangerous likelihood of success in the relevant 
market as defined by Plaintiff. 
86. Google has the power to exclude competition in the U.S. market for 
Android apps and in-app purchases, and it has used that power, including by way of 
its unlawful practices in restraint of trade as described herein, in an attempt to 
monopolize that relevant market. 
87. Google's conduct as described herein, including its unlawful practices 
in restraint of trade, is exclusionary vis-à-vis its rival app stores in the U.S. market 
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for Android apps and in-app purchases. 
88. Google has behaved as alleged herein in an attempt to obtain a 
monopoly in the U.S. market for Android apps and in-app purchases, with the effect 
being that competition is foreclosed, innovation is stifled, and consumer choice is 
gravely diminished. Additionally, Google has abused its market power by charging 
a supra-competitive 30% commission on sales of paid apps and a 30% fee for in-app 
purchases. Further, Google's actions have depressed output and stifled innovation 
and options for consumers as alleged herein. 
89. There is no business necessity or other pro-competitive justification for 
Google's conduct. 
90. Plaintiff and the Class have been injured, and will continue to be 
injured, in their property as a result of Google's conduct, including by way of 
overpaying for Android apps and in-app purchases. 
91. Plaintiff is inclined to continue to purchase Android apps and in-app 
purchases in the future because of her investment in the electronic device containing 
the Android OS. 
92. Plaintiff and the Class also are entitled to equitable relief to prevent 
Google from continuing in its unlawful, inequitable, and unjustified behavior to 
their detriment, with such an injunction at a minimum prohibiting Google from 
continuing to charge a supra-competitive commission on sales of paid apps and a 
supra-competitive percent fee for in-app purchases. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 26. 
XI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment on her behalf 
and on behalf of the Class defined herein, by adjudging and decreeing that: 
1. That the Court determine that this action may be maintained as a class 
action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), (b)(3), and (c)(4), that 
Plaintiff be certified as Class representative, and Plaintiff's counsel be appointed as 
counsel for the Class; 
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2. That the unlawful conduct, practices, and policies alleged herein be 
adjudged and decreed to be unfair and unlawful business practices and policies in 
violation of the UCL, as well as monopolistic acts and practices in violation of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act; 
3. That Defendants have violated the UCL by engaging in conduct that 
constitutes unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices; 
4. That Defendants, their subsidiaries, affiliates, successors, transferees, 
assignees and the respective officers, directors, partners, agents, and employees 
thereof and all other persons acting or claiming to act on their behalf be permanently 
enjoined and restrained from continuing and maintaining their unlawful conduct, 
practices, and policies alleged herein; 
5. That Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to equitable relief appropriate to 
remedy Defendants' past and ongoing restraint of trade, including: 
i. A judicial determination declaring the rights of Plaintiff and the 
Class, and the corresponding responsibilities of Defendants; and 
ii. Issuance of a permanent injunction against Defendants and their 
parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors, transferees, assignees 
and the Respective officers, directors, partners, agents, and 
employees thereof and all other persons acting or claiming to act 
on their behalf from violations of the law as alleged herein. 
6. That Plaintiff and the Class have been injured in their business and 
property as a result of Defendants' violations; 
7. That Plaintiff and the Class recover damages, as provided by law, 
determined to have been sustained as to each of them, in an amount to be trebled in 
accordance with the antitrust laws, and that judgment be entered against Defendants 
on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class; 
8. Plaintiff and the Class recover their costs of suit, including reasonable 
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses of the lawsuit, as provided by law; 
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9. That Plaintiff and the Class be awarded pre-judgment and post-
judgment interest, and that such interest be awarded at the highest legal rate from 
and after the date of service of the initial complaint in this action; 
10. That Defendants are to be jointly and severally responsible financially 
for the costs and expenses of a Court-approved notice program to give immediate 
notification to the Class; and 
11. For such other and further relief as is just under the circumstances. 
XII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL  
Plaintiff and the Class demand a trial by jury of all the claims asserted in this 
complaint that are so triable pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b). 
 
DATED:  November 18, 2020 BROWNE GEORGE ROSS 
O'BRIEN ANNAGUEY & ELLIS LLP 
  Eric M. George 
Maribeth Annaguey 
Carl Alan Roth 
James L. Michaels 






/s/ Eric M. George 
 Eric M. George 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Ashly Esquivel and all 
others similarly situated 
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